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NOTES 
CLEARING THE AIR: HOW AN EFFECTIVE TRANSPARENCY 
POLICY CAN HELP THE U.S. MEET ITS PARIS AGREEMENT 
PROMISE 
Hannah L. Baldwin* 
INTRODUCTION 
The dominance of command-and-control regulation in the 
environmental regulatory scheme has long been criticized as expensive, 
ineffective, and insensitive to the realities of industry. Despite these critiques, 
environmental law and policy in the United States has not seen significant 
reform in the past twenty-five years, resulting in the development of a deeply 
adversarial system of regulation that often leads to compliance failures. A 
signatory to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change “Paris 
Agreement,” the United States has made a renewed commitment to reduce 
our nation’s contributions of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions as a part of a 
global initiative to slow or possibly prevent the potentially catastrophic 
effects of climate change. The advent of this international agreement, and the 
establishment of our Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under it, 
provide an excellent opportunity to re-evaluate the efficacy of our existing 
framework of regulation, and to consider what might be done to improve 
industry compliance. 
* Candidate for J.D., May 2017, University of Pittsburgh School of Law; B.S., 2012, State
University of New York at Buffalo. This Note is dedicated to Sue Tannehill, who first sparked my interest 
in environmental law and policy; Professor George Taylor, whose instruction provided me with the tools 
to think critically and creatively about regulation; and to my friends and family who have shown 
indefatigable support and empathy over these past two and a half years. 
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This Note argues not that command-and-control regulations in the 
environmental regulatory scheme should be replaced entirely, but that they 
may be supplemented through implementing transparency mandates that 
promote self-regulation. While transparency policies have a wide range of 
potential application across various regulatory sectors, the focus of this Note 
is on the utility of those policies in reducing GHGs: particularly, how these 
policies could be implemented to achieve the levels of reductions promised 
in the Paris Agreement as a part of reducing our nation’s NDCs. By looking 
at the recent transparency policy implemented by the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) regarding the sourcing of conflict minerals, this Note 
suggests that GHG emissions could be curbed through the implementation of 
a reporting system like that used by the SEC, combined with one of the 
darlings of the Information Age—a rating system. Combining corporate 
reporting requirements with an effective rating system has the potential to 
reward good corporate behavior through a market-based response based on 
consumer knowledge of those corporations’ performance. 
Part I provides a brief background on the development of command-
and-control regulation and its dominance in American environmental 
regulatory law. Part II will explain the short-comings of command-and-
control regulation, specifically in relation to air pollution and in reducing 
GHG emissions. Part III introduces a contemporary example of the type of 
transparency regulation promoted by this Note—the conflict minerals 
legislation passed as part of the Dodd-Frank finance reform bill (Dodd-
Frank). In Part IV, this Note will propose a regulatory structure similar to 
that put in place through Dodd-Frank, in which companies are required to 
self-report supply chain data. Part IV will also propose the expansion of the 
SEC’s current climate change disclosures and advocate for a more effective 
dissemination of the data disclosed, particularly through implementation of 
a rating program. Part V will discuss current and anticipated challenges to 
the approach proposed in Part IV. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT AND DOMINANCE OF COMMAND-AND-CONTROL 
REGULATION IN U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
The development of regulatory law and the administrative state in the 
United States began in 1887, with the passage of the Interstate Commerce 
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Act.1 The Interstate Commerce Act created the first administrative agency, 
the Interstate Commerce Commission,2 designed to remedy the 
disproportionate bargaining power railroads had when making contracts with 
businesses for the shipping of goods.3 Congress set out to regulate this 
relationship by enacting price-setting measures, mandating that railroads 
abide by the pricing and reporting guidelines provided in the Act or incur a 
penalty.4 This form of regulatory law—where an actor is given strict 
instruction and compelled to follow it in the face of a penalty—is commonly 
known as command-and-control regulation.5 In this sense, the strict 
instruction is the command, and the threat of penalty is the control. As the 
nation grew, the administrative state grew along with it—experiencing rapid 
growth in the post-Depression New Deal era and again in the mid-1960s with 
the addition of energy sector regulation, work place safety initiatives, 
consumer protections, and environmental regulation.6 Now, in 2017, there 
are over 400 federal administrative agencies in the United States.7 
Though the administrative state continues to gain influence over private 
individuals and industry in the United States, some federal agencies have not 
deviated from the standard command-and-control model of regulation that 
was first implemented under the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.8 Federal 
environmental regulations, principally administered through the 
                                                                                                                           
 
1 Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified as revised in scattered sections 
of 49 U.S.C.). 
2 Id. at 383. 
3 Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method, and What to Do About It, 60 VAND. L. 
REV. 609, 617 (2007) (commenting on the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act as the beginning of 
America’s shift toward administrative law and away from common law). 
4 Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379, at 381, 383. 
5 Today there are dozens of regulatory styles, both theoretical and in practice, but this Note will 
principally deal with two distinguished modes: command-and-control and transparency policies. See infra 
Part III. Command-and-control regulation has a somewhat nebulous definition. See David W. Case, The 
Lost Generation: Environmental Regulatory Reform in the Era of Congressional Abdication, 25 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 49, 63 (2014); Jodi L. Short, The Paranoid Style in Regulatory Reform, 63 
HASTINGS L.J. 633, 656 (2012). For the purposes of this Note, command-and-control can most easily be 
understood as the development of strict standards supported by sanctions. 
6 STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 1 (1982). 
7 FED. REG., https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies (last visited Mar. 6, 2016). 
8 But see John D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex 
Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1174 & n.35 (1998) (stating that there is a trend 
moving toward economic incentive and market-driven regulations and away from command-and-control, 
citing numerous supporting arguments in the accompanying footnote). 
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), continue to employ the command-
and-control approach in the vast majority of rulemaking since the agency was 
created in 1970.9 Because of the relatively static state of environmental law 
in the United States,10 it is often seen as the paradigm of the classic 
command-and-control model.11 
An example of this command-and-control style of regulation under the 
EPA’s current control is air pollution regulation under the Clean Air Act.12 
The EPA sets National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) that must 
be met.13 These NAAQS are set for each air pollutant the EPA considers 
reasonably anticipated to endanger public health or welfare and that results 
from numerous or diverse mobile (i.e. vehicles) or stationary sources (i.e. 
industrial stacks).14 Regulated entities are required to obtain permits for 
emitting listed air pollutants and those permits are managed by a state 
environmental agency through State Implementation Programs (SIP).15 Once 
a SIP has been approved, it is administered by the state environmental 
agency.16 Even though control is transferred to the state agency, the federal 
government retains the right to impose sanctions on individuals who violate 
the federally-approved SIP, or to issue an administrative penalty or file a civil 
action against any state who fails to enforce the approved SIP.17 If the SIP 
fails to achieve the NAAQS attainment goals set by the EPA, or if a state 
fails to submit a SIP entirely, the EPA Administrator has the right to impose 
                                                                                                                           
 
9 See Case, supra note 5, at 62–63. 
10 Congress has not passed any major environmental legislation in over twenty-five years. See id. 
at 58–61. 
11 See Molly J. Walker Wilson, A Behavioral Critique of Command-And-Control Environmental 
Regulation, 16 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 223, 223 (2005) (“Since the inception of NEPA [National 
Environmental Policy Act] more than two decades ago, more specific environmental goals have been set 
and legislated, giving rise to the command-and-control system of environmental regulation that exists 
today.”); Short, supra note 5, at 684 (stating that over 58% of all scholarly articles written on command-
and-control regulation from 1980 to 2005 discussed environmental law specifically, and speculating that 
its prominence as a topic in command-and-control scholarship was related to environmental regulations’ 
tendency to regulate processes rather than simply setting targets). 
12 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 7401–31 (2016). 
13 Id. § 7409. 
14 Id. § 7408(a). 
15 Id. § 7410. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. § 7413. 
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sanctions on the nonattainment areas.18 These sanctions imposed by the 
federal government on noncompliant States motivate many State 
governments to impose sanctions on regulated entities through their own 
environmental regulatory laws, creating a layered system of command-and-
control regulations, and shifting the liability for noncompliance from the 
State government to the individual polluters.19  
II. WHY COMMAND-AND-CONTROL IS NOT WORKING 
There are several rationales that could account for the development and 
proliferation of command-and-control regulations in environmental 
regulatory law. For one, pollution is very hard to trace back to a single 
source—once a particulate or molecular pollutant is released into the air, for 
example, there is nothing that identifies that pollutant as belonging to a 
particular source.20 By requiring potential polluters to go through a 
permitting process, the regulator can assert some control at the source, rather 
than attempting to trace a particular pollutant back to its origin after it has 
been emitted. 
The permitting process involved in NAAQS is also administratively 
easier on the regulator—the agency places the burden on the polluter to come 
up with a comprehensive plan for mitigating emissions (within EPA 
                                                                                                                           
 
18 Mandatory sanctions are available under the Clean Air Act for noncompliant States and can take 
two forms, requiring a ratio of at least 2 to 1 emissions reductions within the nonattainment areas for new 
or modified major facilities and the imposition of highway funding sanctions. 42 U.S.C.S. § 7509(b). 
Pursuant to § 7410(m), the Administrator also has the authority to impose discretionary sanctions—for 
example, the Administrator may require compliance in a more flexible timeframe than the 18- and 24-
month frameworks available under § 7509. The sequencing for mandatory sanctions in § 7509 can be 
found in Section 52.31 of title 42 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 
19 See, e.g., Air Pollution Control Act, 35 PA. STAT. § 4009 (West 2016) (Pennsylvania) (providing 
for civil and criminal penalties for violations of the Act); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 142A (West 
2016) (Massachusetts) (providing for civil and criminal penalties for violations of sections 142B-142M 
(all related to air pollution)); Pollution Control Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-1-320 (2016) (South Carolina) 
(providing criminal penalties for willful, grossly negligent or reckless conduct in violation of the Act). 
But see Texas Clean Air Act, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.085 (West 2015) (mandating 
that individuals release no “unauthorized emissions,” but not providing for any enforcement mechanism 
upon failure to comply. Penalties originally provided for under the Act in §§ 382.081 to 382.092 were 
repealed in 1997). See David Fehling, Texas Slams EPA Website that Compares State Pollution 
Enforcement, STATEIMPACT (July 23, 2014, 6:29 AM), https://stateimpact.npr.org/texas/2014/07/23/ 
texas-slams-epa-website-that-compares-state-pollution-enforcement/. 
20 Walker Wilson, supra note 11, at 235. 
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guidelines), while the regulatory body needs only to review and decide to 
either approve or deny the plan.21 The development of these plans often 
requires engineers and other environmental science professionals to perform 
extensive environmental evaluations, which can be both time consuming and 
expensive for the preparer, culminating in high compliance costs.22  Keeping 
these costs with the polluter makes the system of regulation more feasible 
considering time and man-power constraints of regulatory offices. The 
importance of keeping certain chemicals out of the air could also be a 
motivating factor behind the relatively strict controls to which air pollutants 
are subject. Acute releases of certain toxins can cause dramatic increases in 
death and illness rates, while prolonged exposure to steady, low-level 
releases can cause chronic diseases like asthma, emphysema, cancer, or 
arteriosclerosis.23 Implementing a market- or incentive-based regulatory 
scheme when there are lives at stake might be seen as an unnecessary risk. 
Command-and-control legislation is certainly not without its critics. 
Since the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act and the establishment of 
the Environmental Protection Agency (the Act’s administering body), the 
pollution control regulations prescribed by the Act have been widely 
criticized.24 Professor Jodi Short, in her review of scholarly literature 
surrounding the concept of command-and-control, identified the five most 
common criticisms of the regulatory mode: (1) coercive, (2) bureaucratic, 
(3) costly, (4) legalistic, and (5) ineffective.25 While each critique presents its 
own challenges to command-and-control regulations, arguably the most 
troubling from a lawmaker’s perspective is the claim that the regulations are 
ineffective. There are a number of reasons why command-and-control may 
prove ineffective in certain contexts. 
As previously mentioned, the United States’ use of the command-and-
control regulatory scheme has created an adversarial relationship between 
                                                                                                                           
 
21 Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey From 
Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 112 (1998). 
22 Peter Whoriskey, Regulations an economic burden to manufacturers, report says, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 21, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/regulations-an-economic-burden-
to-manufacturers-report-says/2012/08/20/3aa4501a-eb01-11e1-9ddc-340d5efb1e9c_story.html?tid=ss_ 
mail. 
23 DANIEL A. FARBER & ROGER W. FINDLEY, ENVTL. LAW IN A NUTSHELL 102 (8th ed. 2010). 
24 See Walker Wilson, supra note 11; Short, supra note 5; Richard B. Stewart, Economics, 
Environment, and the Limits of Legal Control, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1985). 
25 Short, supra note 5, at 668. 
2016] CLEARING THE AIR 85 
 
Vol. 35, No. 1 (2016) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2016.115 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
regulators and industry.26 This contentious relationship is related to two of 
Short’s identified critiques—that command-and-control legislation is 
unnecessarily bureaucratic and coercive. Regulated entities that oppose 
command-and-control legislation view bureaucrats administering the law as 
too far removed from the realities of the industry, and resent the intrusion of 
government into how they operate their businesses.27 This resentment leads 
to regulatory failure in portions of command-and-control legislation that rely 
on good faith,28 as well as hostility towards citizen groups and other 
concerned parties.29 Hostility towards the regulations only increases the 
likelihood of regulatory violations.30 
The problem with abandoning the type of standard-setting rules 
involved in command-and-control regulation in favor of a market-based 
approach is rather elemental: the majority of governmental regulations find 
justification and rationale in the market’s failure to control certain behaviors 
or outcomes.31 If the market were capable of controlling pollution levels, 
regulation would not have been necessary in the first place.32 While 
deregulation would undoubtedly reduce costs for the regulated parties, there 
is an exhaustive historical record—not to mention one of the most infamous 
economic parables33—supporting the notion that when industry is 
unburdened by environmental regulation, there is no effective market-check 
                                                                                                                           
 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Since regulators do not have the resources to constantly monitor the behavior of potential 
polluters, environmental regulation relies on the regulated entities’ willingness to abide by the regulations 
even when the regulator isn’t looking, so to speak. See Walker Wilson, supra note 11, at 233. 
29 Id. at 237. 
30 Id. at 232–45. 
31 BREYER, supra note 6, at 7–8. 
32 It is uncontroverted that industry had not developed market control for air pollution by the 1970s. 
Dense, visible smog covered many of the nation’s cities and industrial centers, which helped promote 
passage of the Clean Air Act, the nation’s first comprehensive pollution regulation legislation. Clean Air 
Act Requirements and History, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/clean-air-act-
requirements-and-history (last updated July 12, 2016). See also Jialu Chen, Photos of Smoggy 1970s 
America, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 14, 2011, 5:19 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/blue-marble/2011/12/ 
smog-photos-1970s-america (showing photos of smog-covered cities across America from the EPA-
commissioned Documerica series, which ran from 1971 until 1977). 
33 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, SCIENCE MAGAZINE (Dec. 13, 1968), 
http://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/162/3859/1243.full.pdf. 
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to prevent polluters from externalizing the costs of production,34 creating 
ruinous societal costs.35 While the cost might be a burden for industry, recent 
studies have shown that the benefits to society that result from industry 
regulation greatly outweigh the costs imposed on industry.36 
Although, based on these authorities and common sense, it seems 
unlikely that deregulation of air emissions would lead to any reduction in air 
pollution, the current system of command-and-control regulation is not 
perfect. Because many regulated parties view pollution regulations as a 
production cost, some become “amoral calculators,” choosing to increase 
their profit by violating the law when the benefits of violation will exceed 
whatever penalties they might incur if a regulator were to catch them.37 One 
solution to the amoral calculators problem could be to increase the penalties 
imposed on actors who exceed their permit limitations or to provide 
particularly stringent penalties for willful violations, effectively raising the 
                                                                                                                           
 
34 An externalized cost is a cost related to an individual’s action that is not born by that individual, 
but is borne by another individual, group, or society as a whole. Market-based regulations are only 
effective when the costs remain with the polluter—when the costs of pollution are not borne by the 
polluter, there is little incentive to devote resources to curbing pollution. FARBER & FINDLEY, supra note 
23, at 93. 
35 Societal costs of pollution include increased healthcare costs, damage to commercial crops, and 
ecological remediation and clean-up costs among many others. See Mary Vaiana, Cost and Health 
Consequences of Air Pollution in California, RAND HEALTH (2010), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research 
_briefs/RB9501/index1.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2016) (stating that failing to meet federal air quality 
standards led to nearly 30,000 hospitalizations in California from 2005 to 2007). See also Douglas M. 
Costle, Control Benefits Exceed Costs, 4 EPA J. 26, 26 (1978) (stating that pollutants can be dangerous 
not only to human health, but may cause property damage, disrupt fisheries, and reduce crop yields—
citing specifically to West Coast grape yield reductions of as much as 60 percent which researchers found 
were related to industrial smog); Walter Gellhorn, Deregulation: Delight or Delusion?, 24 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 469, 473–75 (1980) (arguing that the cost of regulation is often less than the cost of remediation 
(clean-up), pointing to the cited environmental disasters as illustrative of the common industry attitude 
that “what is not forbidden is regarded as permitted”). 
36 According to the Office of Management and Budget, from fiscal years 2001 to 2011, major 
federal regulations provided annual benefits totaling between $141 and $691 billion and had estimated 
annual costs of only $42.4 billion to $66.3 billion, with EPA regulations accounting for 60 to 82% of the 
benefits and 43 to 53% of the costs. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-519, ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION: EPA SHOULD IMPROVE ADHERENCE TO GUIDELINES FOR SELECTED ELEMENTS OF 
REGULATORY ANALYSES (2014). But see E. Donald Elliott, Recipe for Industrial Policy: Blending 
Environmentalism and International Competitiveness, 19 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 305, 308 (1993) (noting that the 
benefits of environmental regulation can be difficult to quantify, resulting in difficulty applying a cost-
benefit analysis). 
37 Jodi Short & Michael W. Toffel, Making Self-Regulation More Than Merely Symbolic: The 
Critical Role of the Legal Environment, 55 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 361–69 (2010). 
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penalties to such a rate that would make it economically unfavorable to 
pollute and pay the fine rather than comply with the regulations. There are 
several issues with this solution, however. The first problem with increasing 
penalties lies in the disparity between the benefits of regulatory compliance 
and the industry costs in complying—polluting the air is not an act easily 
undone.38 Carbon dioxide emitted from the first plant built during the 
Industrial Revolution at the turn of the nineteenth century still exists in the 
atmosphere today.39 Increasing penalties may change some polluters’ 
behavior, but others will likely continue their illegal polluting practices, 
hoping regulators will not discover their unlawful actions. 
Additionally, increasing fines does not address the inherent difficulties 
in detecting the violations. Many air pollutants are not easily detected (carbon 
monoxide, for example, is colorless, odorless, and deadly), and determining 
whether or not a particular plant is in compliance would require access to the 
plant, which would in turn require notice of impending inspection, giving 
polluters the opportunity to come into compliance before the inspectors 
arrive.40 
There is also, of course, the usual administrative plague of growing 
regulatory demands and shrinking regulatory budgets, leading to delayed 
and/or ineffective enforcement by the regulatory agency.41 The number of 
facilities and the diversity of responsibilities most environmental regulators 
are assigned make it logistically impossible for comprehensive monitoring to 
occur at every site, so the regulators often rely on self-reported disclosures.42 
Self-reporting could lead to companies’ failure to follow proper disclosure 
requirements, to unwitting misreporting, or to intentionally misleading 
regulators by reporting false information.43 
                                                                                                                           
 
38 See sources cited supra note 35. 
39 Mason Inman, Carbon is Forever, NATURE (Nov. 20, 2008), http://www.nature.com/climate/ 
2008/0812/full/climate.2008.122.html. 
40 Walker Wilson, supra note 11, at 237. 
41 Short & Toffel, supra note 37. 
42 Walker Wilson, supra note 11, at 239. 
43 The Tonawanda Coke plant near Niagara Falls, New York is a contemporary and incredibly 
poignant example of this type of intentional violation. Tonawanda Coke’s chief environmental compliance 
officer was found to have intentionally underreported emissions of benzene, formaldehyde, and other 
harmful chemicals that went undetected for years before regulators issued an injunction against the plant. 
Elizabeth Shogren, Sandra Bartlett & Kristen Lombardi, N.Y. Plant’s Neighbors Expose Regulatory Gaps, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/11/10/142189390/tonawanda-provides-
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Where Do We Go From Here? 
While it is true that regulated parties are often motivated by profit, it is 
unfair and inaccurate to claim that money is the only motivating factor behind 
industry action. Most companies, in addition to concern for the continued 
profitability of their business, are concerned with the creation and 
maintenance of a corporate identity (though the two are not necessarily 
entirely severable).44 There are also moral considerations that contribute to a 
desired company culture and environmental or social responsibility 
policies.45 By combining these two driving forces—developing a positive 
corporate identity and maximizing firm profits—transparency policies, like 
conflict minerals legislation, can supplement existing regulations by 
providing the benefit of building a positive corporate identity when 
companies comply with regulations. Requiring disclosure could allow the 
EPA and state regulators to relax pre-emission permitting requirements, 
giving the industry more flexibility to develop new methods of pollution 
control while still receiving detailed reports on industry compliance at the 
expense of the regulated party. The conflict minerals legislation provides an 
excellent example of a contemporary implementation of a mandated 
reporting transparency policy like the one that this Note proposes be used to 
supplement existing GHG emissions regulations. 
III. SUPPLY CHAIN REGULATION THROUGH SEC CORPORATE FINANCIAL 
FILINGS—THE CONFLICT MINERALS LEGISLATION OF DODD-FRANK 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act  
(“Dodd-Frank” or “the Act”) was signed into law by President Obama on 
July 21, 2010.46 Touted as an answer to many of the problems that lead to the 
Great Recession, the Act sought “to promote financial stability in the United 
States, by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, 
                                                                                                                           
 
lessons-for-fighting-toxic-air. During those years, several residents had complained illnesses ranging from 
breathing problems to rashes, cancer, and infertility. Id. When asked about the agency’s failure to detect 
and investigate the emissions sooner, the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation 
commissioner blamed the department’s failure to discover the violations on a lack of sophisticated 
equipment and the elusive nature of toxic pollutants. Id. 
44 Short & Toffel, supra note 37, at 365–66. 
45 Id. 
46 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 (2010). 
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to end ‘too big to fail,’ to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, 
to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, . . . .” and, as 
noted at the end of this non-exhaustive list of goals, the Act was also to be 
used for “other purposes.”47 The Act spans an expansive 2,300 pages and 
touches ten different regulatory agencies, dealing mostly with supervision 
and regulation of financial institutions.48 The subject of this Note, however, 
falls under the “other purposes” category: the regulation of the use of 
“conflict minerals” in consumer products.49 
Section 1502 of Dodd-Frank50 was added to the bill under Section 15, 
titled “Miscellaneous Provisions.”51 Predictably, the conflict minerals 
regulations were originally introduced by Senators Feingold, Durbin, and 
Brownbank as a separate bill, titled “Congo Conflict Minerals Act,” S. 891,52 
but, unsuccessful on its own, the senators ultimately instead decided to 
propose the bill’s provisions as an amendment to Dodd-Frank. The conflict 
minerals language, after review by industry representatives, government 
agencies, and the Banking Committee, was added to the fourth draft of the 
bill on May 20, 2010, and eventually passed with the rest of the Act in July.53 
The conflict minerals legislation established a basis for the SEC to 
create a mandatory supply-chain reporting scheme for publicly traded 
companies that use conflict minerals in their products.54 That scheme would, 
in turn, encourage companies to source the minerals outside of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and neighboring countries (the 
“Covered Countries”), where the trade of such minerals contributes to the 
                                                                                                                           
 
47 111 P.L. 203, Part 1 of 3, 124 Stat. 1376, 1377 (2010). 
48 William Sweet, Dodd Frank Act Becomes Law, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate 
Governance and Financial Regulation (July 21, 2010), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/07/21/dodd-
frank-act-becomes-law/. 
49 “Conflict minerals” as defined in the Act, include columbite-tantalite (coltan), cassiterite (tin), 
gold, wolframite (tungsten), or their derivatives; or any other mineral or its derivatives determined by the 
Secretary of State to be financing conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo or any adjoining country. 
111 P.L. 203, Part 3 of 3, 124 Stat. 1376, 2218. These minerals are used in a variety of products, but 
perhaps most prominently and irreplaceably in consumer electronics like laptops, cellphones, and mp3 
players. See Elizabeth Dias, First Blood Diamonds, Now Blood Computers?, TIME MAGAZINE (July 24, 
2009), http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1912594,00.html. 
50 Now codified at 15 U.S.C.S. § 78m(p) (2016). 
51 111 P.L. 203, Part 3 of 3, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213. 
52 156 CONG. REC. S.3965-03 (daily ed. May 19, 2010) (statement of Sen. Feingold). 
53 H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2009). 
54 Sweet, supra note 48. 
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growing humanitarian crisis stemming from ongoing civil war in the region.55 
The legislation included in Dodd-Frank requires companies to disclose and 
make public annually if the minerals in their products originate or may have 
originated in the DRC or neighboring countries, and to provide information 
on due diligence and on source and chain of custody to the SEC, but did not 
provide for any sanctions for companies whose reports showed continued use 
of conflict minerals.56 
The idea behind the mandatory reporting scheme developed through 
Section 1502 and subsequent SEC regulations was to increase transparency 
in the sourcing of conflict minerals, in hopes that American consumers and 
investors could make more informed decisions based on the companies’ 
ethical practices, presumably favoring companies who avoided sourcing the 
minerals from areas in conflict over those that did not.57 This type of 
legislation is known as a transparency policy. According to The 
Transparency Policy Project—an initiative seeking to improve and expand 
the use of transparency policies—a transparency policy is a “public 
requirement[] that corporations or other organizations disclose factual 
information to reduce public risks that those organizations create or flaws in 
their performance.”58 Transparency policies, unlike traditional command-
and-control legislation, rely on market forces to compel companies to behave 
ethically, rather than relying on the imposition of fines or other disciplinary 
actions administered by the government. While this type of nationally-
mandated disclosure program is not entirely novel,59 it is the first of its type 
to be implemented by the SEC with regard to consumer products. 
                                                                                                                           
 
55 Id. For more information about the trade of conflict minerals in the region and how they 
contribute to the humanitarian crisis in the DRC, see Jeffery Gettleman, The Price of Precious, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC (Oct. 2013), http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2013/10/conflict-minerals/gettleman-text. 
56 15 U.S.C.S. § 78m(p). 
57 See 156 CONG. REC. S.3976 (daily ed. May 19, 2010) (Statement of Sen. Feingold). 
58 Harvard Kennedy School Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation, What are 
transparency policies?, THE TRANSPARENCY POLICY PROJECT, http://www.transparencypolicy.net/ 
FAQs.php (last visited Nov. 22, 2016) [hereinafter The Transparency Policy Project]. 
59 See 42 U.S.C.S. § 11023 (2016) (an aggregation of mandated reporting by industries using certain 
quantities of toxic chemicals under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act); 
OSHA Hazardous Communication Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (2013) (resulting in the 
proliferation of Material Safety Data Sheets, requiring employers to provide certain information to 
employees regarding hazardous chemicals they may interact with while working). 
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Successes and Shortcomings of the Conflict Minerals Regulations 
The conflict minerals guidelines included in Dodd-Frank remain 
somewhat controversial and results have been slow to show.60 The SEC 
regulations required that companies’ first reports be filed by June 1, 2014, 
and according to a Government Office of Accountability report released in 
August of 2015 (hereinafter referred to as “the Report”), most companies 
were unable to determine the source of their conflict minerals, claiming that 
the information was too difficult to obtain from their suppliers.61 So, the 
resulting disclosures of companies practicing due diligence in accordance 
with the SEC regulations were limited because the majority of companies 
surveyed in the Report maintained that they could not determine the origin 
of the minerals in their supply chains.62 Even though the goals of promoting 
transparency to the consumer and investors may not have been fully realized 
due to insufficiencies in reporting mechanisms, there is tangible evidence to 
show that the legislation had the intended effect of drastically reducing 
minerals sourced from the DRC or neighboring countries, which lead to the 
creation of “green mines” that had been freed from armed rule in the Covered 
Countries and prompting the government in those countries to work with the 
United States to assure trade from these mines would not fuel violence.63 
It may be too soon to place the label of “success” on the Dodd-Frank 
conflict minerals regulations, but reports from NGOs largely praising the 
                                                                                                                           
 
60 See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, 800 F.3d 518, 556 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (declaring 
that portions of the statute requiring regulated entities to identify their products as not “DRC conflict free” 
were violations of the First Amendment). As Attorney General Loretta Lynch pointed out in a letter to 
Speaker of the House Paul Ryan following the SEC’s decision not to appeal the court’s decision, however, 
the opinion can be read to invalidate only the SEC’s rule regarding the particular designation of products 
as “not DRC conflict free,” and not to affect the validity of Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act. See 
Letter from Loretta Lynch, United States Attorney General, to Paul Ryan, Speaker of the House (Mar.  4, 
2016), https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-library/osg-530d-letters/3-4-2016.pdf/download. Therefore, the 
case may prove to have little impact on the validity of the statute, and only a small effect on the SEC’s 
promulgated regulations. 
61 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-561, SEC CONFLICT MINERALS RULE 15-16 
(2015). 
62 Id. at 18. 
63 Id. at 35; see also AMNESTY INT’L, WORLD REPORT 2015–2016: THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S 
HUMAN RIGHTS (2015–2016), https://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/pol1025522016english 
.pdf; Fidel Bafilemba, Timo Mueller & Sasha Lezhnev, The Impact of Dodd-Frank and Conflict Minerals 
Reforms on Eastern Congo’s Conflict, ENOUGHPROJECT 1 (June 2014), http://www.enoughproject.org/ 
files/Enough%20Project%20-%20The%20Impact%20of%20Dodd-Frank%20and%20Conflict%20 
Minerals%20Reforms%20on%20Eastern%20Congo%E2%80%99s%20Conflict%2010June2014.pdf. 
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effects the law has had in the region provide enough evidence that the policies 
have effected positive changes in the region, even if the reporting has not 
been as effective as Congress envisioned when it passed the bill. 
VI. THE PARIS AGREEMENT AND NATIONAL COMMITMENTS TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE MITIGATION—WHY TRANSPARENCY POLICIES COULD WORK 
NOW 
On December 12, 2015, President Obama signed the United Nations 
Framework on Climate Change’s Paris Agreement, committing to implement 
policies within the United States designed to hold the increase of global 
temperature rise to two degrees Celsius.64 In order to achieve that goal, each 
signing country is required to develop Nationally Determined Contributions 
to serve as an outline for implementing required GHG emissions policy 
changes.65 The United States took an understandably broad approach to its 
NDC submission, projecting an economy-wide target of reducing GHG 
emissions by 26–28% below 2005 levels, making best efforts to reach a 28% 
reduction by 2025.66 While these numbers are not particularly ambitious,67 
GHG emissions regulations have an embattled history in the United States, 
partially due to the persistence of “climate deniers” holding seats in 
Congress,68 so it is likely that any traditional environmental regulatory 
reform aimed at controlling industry’s GHG emissions will not find an easy 
path to passage.69 
                                                                                                                           
 
64 G.A. Res. 1/CP.21, at 2, The Paris Agreement (Dec. 12, 2015). 
65 Id. at 3. 
66 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.S. Cover Note, INDC and Accompanying 
Information, INDCS AS COMMUNICATED BY PARTIES (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www4.unfccc.int/ 
submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/United%20States%20of%20America/1/U.S.%20Cover%2
0Note%20INDC%20and%20Accompanying%20Information.pdf. 
67 Fiona Harvey & Suzanne Goldenberg, US Pledges emissions cuts of up to 28% ahead of global 
climate treaty, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/mar/31/ 
us-set-to-propose-emissions-cuts-of-28-ahead-of-global-climate-treaty (the current U.S. targets represent 
only a 10% decrease from 1990 levels, which were traditionally the reference point in United Nations 
Climate Reports). 
68 Tom McCarthy, Meet the Republicans in Congress who don’t believe climate change is real, 
THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/nov/17/climate-change 
-denial-scepticism-republicans-congress. 
69 See Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (a 5-4 decision that the EPA was 
mandated to regulate GHGs as air pollutants after the EPA commissioner under the Bush Administration 
declined to promulgate rules regarding GHGs); see also Jonathan H. Alder, Supreme Court Puts the 
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The Paris Agreement represents our nation’s global commitment to stop 
the potentially catastrophic events that may result with an average global 
temperature increase of two degrees Celsius. It has long been recognized that 
developing countries, especially island nations, stand to lose the most as a 
result of warming.70 At the current rate of warming, and if trends continue, 
the Maldives, a small island nation in the Indian Ocean, will be completely 
submerged.71 This result is not only tragic for the people of the Maldives that 
will become a stateless nation if this warming continues, but it also implicates 
western, developed nations. The United States has been emitting GHGs into 
the atmosphere in prodigious proportions for the past 200 years, arguably 
contributing the most out of any country in the world to anthropogenic 
warming.72 Because of our wealth and the sheer land mass of the United 
States, however, we who contributed the most and who have benefited the 
most from the emissions of GHGs into the atmosphere will be largely 
insulated from the early effects of climate change.73 
The press and media coverage surrounding the Paris Agreement also 
signifies a change in social awareness and interest in climate change policy 
among citizens.74 While the United States as a nation still remains among the 
most skeptical about climate change,75 studies show that the majority of 
                                                                                                                           
 
Brakes on the EPA’s Clean Power Plan, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/02/09/supreme-court-puts-the-brakes-on-the-epas-clean-power-plan/. 
70 Kennedy Warne, Will Pacific Island Nations Disappear as Seas Rise? Maybe Not, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 13, 2015), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/02/150213-tuvalu-sopoaga-
kench-kiribati-maldives-cyclone-marshall-islands/. 
71 Mark Phillips, Visit the Maldives, Before They Disappear, CBS NEWS (Dec. 7, 2009, 1:58 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/visit-the-maldives-before-they-disappear/. 
72 Bill Blakemore, Who’s ‘Most to Blame’ for Global Warming?, ABC NEWS (July 22, 2012), http:  
//abcnews.go.com/blogs/technology/2012/07/whos-most-to-blame-for-global-warming/. 
73 A bad climate for development, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.economist.com/ 
node/14447171 (stating that developing countries are more vulnerable to the effects of climate change 
due to factors such as inadequate housing, poor health and healthcare, increased likelihood of contracting 
life threatening diseases, and the devastating effects that environmental disasters have on tourism and 
farming, upon which many developing economies depend). 
74 Sonya Gurwitt & Timmons Roberts, The Paris climate talks according to U.S. print media: 
Plenty of heat, but not so much light, THE BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.brookings.edu/ 
blogs/planetpolicy/posts/2015/12/18-cop21-paris-climate-talks-us-print-media-roberts (stating that 424 
articles were published about the Paris climate talks by The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, 
Los Angeles Times, and USA Today over the course of two weeks). 
75 Where in the World Is Climate Change Denial Most Prevalent?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/climate/2015-paris-climate-talks/where-in-the-world-is-
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Americans agree with regulating GHGs in an effort to curb the effects of 
climate change, a change in opinion that has increased steadily over the past 
nine years.76 This increase in public engagement with climate change issues 
is essential to the success of a potential transparency policy. Concerns about 
climate change will hopefully motivate American consumers to consider the 
environmental policies of companies before patronizing them or investing in 
them. Such concerns might also motivate companies to make efforts to 
reduce GHG emissions in anticipation of the market favoring more ethical 
practices, just as companies did in response to the conflict minerals 
legislation. 
There are some inherent parallels between the humanitarian concern 
driving Congress to pass the conflict minerals legislation and the potential 
introduction of GHG supply chain emissions regulations. The conflict 
minerals legislation was passed in recognition of American companies’ 
contributions to the on-going civil war in the DRC.77 Since the United States 
cannot exert direct control over the way minerals are mined in foreign states, 
it instead opted to construct a framework of reporting that incentivized 
companies to ethically source the minerals. In the context of GHG emissions, 
mandated GHG emissions reporting for all companies whose production 
processes meet a certain threshold could not only be a solution to the current 
regulatory rut in environmental policy, but could also act as a check on 
American business owners acting with global consequences when they 
release GHGs into the atmosphere. Congress can separate supply chain GHG 
regulations from traditional environmental command-and-control legislation 
and take them out of the adversarial context by regulating them under the 
SEC. 
Apart from the humanitarian purposes of reducing the United States’ 
emissions of GHGs which are parallel to the goals of the conflict minerals 
rules, there is another compelling connection between climate change and the 
                                                                                                                           
 
climate-denial-most-prevalent (stating that the United States had more climate deniers respond in the 
twenty-country survey than any other). 
76 See A bad climate for development, supra note 73 (referencing the Global Trends Report 
published by Ipsos Mori in 2014, which reported that 54% of Americans agree that climate change is 
largely a result of human activity). See also Fredrick Mayer, Sarah Adair & Alex Pfaff, Americans Think 
the Climate is Changing and Support Some Actions, DUKE UNIV. (Feb. 2013), https://nicholasinstitute.  
duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/ni_pb_13-01_0.pdf. 
77 See 156 CONG. REC. S.3965-03 (daily ed. May 19, 2010) (statement of Sen. Feingold). 
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SEC. The mission of the SEC is to “protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, 
and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”78 An integral part of 
this mission is to provide investors with financial reports and other 
information through requiring publicly traded companies to make this data 
public.79 Recognizing the potential liabilities companies assume when 
engaging in certain environmentally “dirty” activities, the SEC began 
requiring United States companies to disclose environmental data related to 
estimated future costs for hazardous waste clean-up and environmental 
lawsuits involving fines exceeding $100,000.80 It is now becoming 
increasingly evident that the companies will soon start to feel the financial 
effects of climate change affecting their bottom lines, as well.81 There is 
currently a push by New York State Attorney General Eric Schneiderman 
and members of Congress to investigate Exxon Mobil for lying to the public 
and investors about the risks of climate change based on their own internal 
reports.82 
V. TYPES OF TRANSPARENCY POLICIES AND WHAT WOULD WORK FOR 
GHG EMISSIONS 
As mentioned above, the conflict minerals legislation in Dodd-Frank 
employs a legislative approach known as a transparency policy.83 The goal 
of a transparency policy as a regulatory mode is to promote self-regulation 
                                                                                                                           
 
78 What We Do, SEC.GOV, https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Sept. 14, 
2016). 
79 Id. 
80 Remarks of Richard Y. Roberts: Overview of Environmental Liability Disclosure Requirements, 
Recent Developments and Materiality, SEC.GOV (Aug. 9, 1993), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1993/ 
080993roberts.pdf. 
81 Costs related to climate change can be related to an increase in weather disasters, effects of new 
state and federal regulations sparked by international commitments like the Paris Agreement, and other 
insurance and liability that can evolve from climate change policy. Jim Coburn & Jackie Cook, Cool 
Response: The SEC and Corporate Climate Change Reporting, CERES (Feb. 2013), https://www.  
ceres.org/resources/reports/cool-response-the-sec-corporate-climate-change-reporting/. 
82 Letters from Congress Members to Energy Companies (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.  
documentcloud.org/documents/2644319-Lieu-Letter.html; A Range of Opinions on Climate Change at 
Exxon Mobil, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/11/06/science/ 
exxon-mobil-global-warming-statements-climate-change.html. 
83 See discussion supra Part III. 
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within regulated entities through the dissemination of data.84 By requiring the 
entities to provide detailed information regarding their practices without 
prescribing a certain way to carry out those practices and without imposing 
sanctions if entities fail to comply with any agency-set goal, companies have 
more flexibility to comply with standards set by either the government or by 
other industry leaders. While the government may still have a role in setting 
standards, by removing penalties and sanctions that often accompany 
noncompliance with environmental regulation, much of the adversarial 
character of the relationship between regulator and regulated entity 
dissipates. 
There are several different approaches to implementing a transparency 
policy.85 This Note promotes extending the same nationally mandated 
disclosure approach employed by lawmakers in the conflict minerals 
legislation to the context of GHG supply chain reporting. Nationally 
mandated disclosure simply requires that all entities falling within the bounds 
of the legislation disclose certain information. In the case of the conflict 
minerals legislation, that information was related to supply chains. 
The SEC currently requires large emitters of GHGs to report emissions 
data through the Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program, which came into effect 
on September 10, 2010.86 This transparency policy is similar to the conflicts 
mineral legislation in that it requires the large majority of industry actors87 to 
disclose information related to their internal activity.88 Where the two differ, 
unfortunately, is with the efficacy of the two policies. While both policies, 
like many other transparency policies, are plagued by inefficient data 
dissemination,89 the amount and scope of the data collected by SEC regarding 
GHG emissions is far more unwieldy to the average consumer. The reason 
                                                                                                                           
 
84 See STEVEN LYDENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: GUIDING THE INVISIBLE 
HAND 57 (2005). 
85 There are four distinct approaches to achieving industry transparency: international standards for 
disclosure, nationally mandated disclosure, disaggregated data, and voluntary individualized company 
disclosure. For an in-depth discussion of these different strategies and examples of organizations that have 
implemented them, see id. at 57–77. 
86 40 C.F.R. Part 98. 
87 The agriculture and land use sectors, certain fossil fuel suppliers, and smaller emitters are 
excluded from reporting data under the rule. Fact Sheet—Greenhouse Gases Reporting Program 
Implementation, EPA.GOV (Nov. 2013), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-09/documents/ 
ghgrp-overview-factsheet.pdf. 
88 40 C.F.R. § 98.3. 
89 See LYDENBERG, supra note 84, at 68. 
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this has disproportionately affected the efficacy of the GHG data is that 
companies regulated under the conflicts minerals legislation seem to have 
taken action as a result of the publication of their supply chain data, while 
GHG emitters have not. 
One possible explanation for this marked difference between the effects 
on industry that these two policies have had is that the conflicts minerals 
legislation has a more dichotomous reporting result—either you are sourcing 
minerals from countries in conflict or you are not—while the supply chain 
data that is required through the regulation is somewhat more nuanced, the 
ultimate finding is easy to understand. The GHG emissions reporting, 
however, while relatively easy to navigate through the EPA’s reporting 
website, reports the metric tons of the required GHGs emitted by each 
regulated facility.90 Even assuming a consumer would take the initiative to 
find the appropriate EPA website, look up the specific regulated entity, and 
read the reported data, there is no point of reference from which to compare 
the entities’ emissions. There is no indication of rating or approval attached 
to the data, so the availability of this raw data to the public has very little 
force.91 
So how can the United States improve its current GHG transparency 
policies to drive the market towards a greener and more sustainable future? 
Add a rating program. Ratings systems are wildly popular across multiple 
sectors in private industry and can have a profound effect on the choices 
individuals make.92 A rating program organizes and compiles raw data, like 
the data on emissions from the EPA, and provides comparisons, allowing 
consumers to digest the information in a much simpler way. Rating agencies 
provide simple, accessible information for stockholders and consumers about 
regulated entities’ performance, giving meaning to the metric tons released 
by putting them in the larger industry context.93 A rating system or 
organization could be established through a government program,94 which 
                                                                                                                           
 
90 See, e.g., Scrubgrass Generating Plant, http://ghgdata.epa.gov/ghgp/service/facilityDetail/2014?  
id=1001256&ds=E&et=&popup=true (last visited Nov. 20, 2016). 
91 See LYDENBERG, supra note 84, at 68. 
92 See Eleanor Barkhorn, College Rankings Really Do Influence Which Schools Students Apply To 
(Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2014/01/college-rankings-really-do-
influence-which-schools-students-apply-to/283151/. 
93 See LYDENBERG, supra note 84, at 88. 
94 Compare to the EPA’s current “Energy Star” program. See ENERGY STAR, 
https://www.energystar.gov/about (last visited Nov. 20, 2016). 
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could provide a centralized data hub that allows consumers easy access to the 
reporters’ compliance information. 
VI. POTENTIAL CHALLENGES TO TRANSPARENCY POLICIES AND RATING 
SYSTEMS IN CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 
Because mandated reporting does not impose any sanctions on regulated 
entities for failing to meet a regulatory standard, it is essential to any 
successful transparency policy that the information disclosed by the 
regulated parties has value to consumers.95 If consumers are not interested in 
the size of a particular good’s GHG footprint, then they will continue to 
choose products based on other factors, such as price. Without the market 
shift towards goods that are produced with lower emissions, the transparency 
policies will have no influence on lowering GHG emissions. It is clear from 
the current state of SEC transparency reporting that the market is still 
incapable, at this stage, of regulating GHG emissions reductions to the levels 
we need to reach to meet our Paris Agreement commitments. Therefore, we 
are not in a position to remove command-and-control regulations that are in 
place to prevent unacceptably high costs on society. While this market-
mobilization is a challenge, through the implementation of data 
dissemination policies like rating systems that provide consumers with easily 
accessible information about an entity’s performance, transparency policies 
could play a much bigger role in the regulation of GHGs in the future. 
There are also problems inherent to transparency policies generally. The 
data provided to the government through mandated reporting is self-reported 
data, and companies have numerous motivations to falsify that data, 
especially if they feel that the impact of a poor rating through a government 
or independent auditing rating system could negatively impact their public 
image or their profits.96 The recent exposure of the Volkswagen emissions 
reporting scandal is an excellent example of this possibility.97 In order to 
ensure that companies are reporting emissions honestly, extensive auditing 
of the reporting process must be carried out. This type of monitoring would 
                                                                                                                           
 
95 The Transparency Policy Project, supra note 58. 
96 See Short supra note 5, at 364. 
97 Volkswagen cheated emissions testing on its line of “clean diesel” vehicles by changing car 
performance standards during testing and during actual vehicle operation on the road. For a more detailed 
explanation of the emissions cheating scandal, see Russell Hotten, Volkswagen: The scandal explained, 
BBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34324772. 
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most likely prove cost-prohibitive for regulators, who would have to engage 
in a series of randomized auditing to reduce costs, increasing the likelihood 
that false reporting goes unnoticed. 
Ratings systems can also create comparisons that are over-simplified if 
large amounts of time and resources are not put into their development and 
dissemination. Ratings systems have the potential to ignore differences 
between types of regulated entities, giving the appearance of better or worse 
performance based on arbitrary factors such as the nature of the industry the 
entity is a part of or the size or scope of the entity’s activities. These systems 
may also be susceptible to First Amendment challenges like the conflict 
minerals legislation issue in the National Association of Manufacturers v. 
Securities Exchange Commission case—industry would likely resist 
mandatory labeling of their performance as unsatisfactory. 
CONCLUSION 
With the 2025 deadlines of our NDCs looming, it is time to engage all 
GHG emitting industries in an effort to create new legislation with which 
regulators, consumers, and regulated entities can work. While there is still a 
need for some command-and-control regulations where air pollutants such as 
GHGs are involved in order to protect public health, imposing penalties on 
emitters for noncompliance could become increasingly rare as polluters are 
motivated by market forces resulting from improved transparency and data 
dissemination policies implemented and enforced by the SEC and EPA in 
tandem. A shift from the adversarial nature of environmental regulation will 
likely improve compliance and motivate regulated parties to engage with 
regulators rather than resist them. 
